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I. INTRODUCTION
Currently, thirty-eight states and the federal government have death
penalty statutes; of these, eleven employ electrocution,1 five lethal gas,2
1. See ALA. CODE § 15-18-82 (1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-100 (West 1995); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 922.10 (West 1985 & Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-38 (1990); IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-38-6-1 (West 1986); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 431.220 (Michie 1994); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 29-2532 (1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2949.22 (Anderson 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-3-
530 (Law Co-op. 1989 & Supp. 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-23-114 (1990); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 53.1-234 (Michie 1996) (choice between electrocution and lethal injection).
2. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-704 (West 1995) (choice between lethal gas and lethal
injection); MIss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-51 (1994) (lethal gas for sentences imposed before 1984 or
if lethal injection is unconstitutional); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 546.720 (West 1995) (lethal gas or lethal
injection); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-187 (1983) (choice between lethal gas and lethal injection);
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-904 (Michie 1995) (lethal gas if lethal injection is unconstitutional).
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two hanging,3 three firing squad,4 and twenty-six lethal injection.5 The
death penalty has been a traditional method of punishment in the United
States-it has historically been widely accepted and carried out in most
jurisdictions.6 In spite of this, challenges to the death penalty have con-
tinually questioned the constitutionality of the penalty under the cruel
and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.7 Seminal cases in the United States Supreme Court
have varied as to the grounds of challenge, but three basic categories
have emerged--challenges to proportionality, challenges to the death
penalty itself, and challenges to the class of people on whom the death
penalty can be imposed.8
In the 1970's, the Supreme Court declared the death penalty uncon-
stitutional on grounds that it was arbitrarily and capriciously imposed.9
More recently, cases have principally involved challenges to the class of
people on whom the death penalty can be constitutionally imposed. 10
3. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-19-103 (1979) (choice between hanging and lethal injection);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.180 (West 1990) (choice between hanging and lethal injection).
4. See IDAHO CODE § 19-2716 (1987) (firing squad if lethal injection is impractical); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1014 (West 1986) (electrocution if lethal injection is unconstitutional, firing
squad if electrocution is unconstitutional); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-5.5 (1996) (choice between
firing squad and lethal injection).
5. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-704 (West 1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-615 (Michie
1995); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3604 (West 1996); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-401 (West 1990
& Supp. 1996); DEz.. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(F) (1987 & Supp. 1994); IDAHO CODE § 19-2716
(1987); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1119-5 (West 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:569(B)
(West 1992); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 71 (1992); MIss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-51 (1994); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 546.720 (West 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. §46-19-103 (1979) (choice between
hanging and injection); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 176.355 (Michie 1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 630:5 XIII, XIV (1996) (unless impractical and then hanging is the method); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:49-2 (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-14-11 (Michie 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-187
(1983) (choice between gas and injection); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22., § 1014 (West 1986); OR.
REV. STAT. § 137.473 (1995); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 2121.1 (Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-32 (1988); TEX. CRIM. CODE ANN. § 43.14 (West 1995); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-18-5.5 (1996) (firing squad or injection); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-234 (Michie 1996)
(choice between electrocution and injection); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.95.180 (West 1990)
(hanging or injection); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-904 (Michie 1995) (lethal gas if lethal injection
is held unconstitutional).
6. At one time forty-eight states employed the death penalty. See Campbell v. Wood, 18
F.3d 662, 697 (9th Cir. 1994) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (referring to death by hanging), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 2125 (1994). Judge Reinhardt also noted that Alaska and Hawaii have never
employed capital punishment since obtaining statehood. Id. at 697 n.6.
7. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. For a
discussion of cases interpreting Eighth Amendment see infra Part Ill.
8, See infra Part III for a discussion of these cases.
9. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). There was no one rationale underlying the
Furman decision. Five Justices wrote separate concurring opinions-Douglas, Brennan, Stewart,
White and Marshall-and four wrote separate dissents-Blackmun, Burger, Powell and
Rehnquist. See also infra Part III for a detailed discussion of Furman.
10. See infra Part III for a discussion of these cases.
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While many of the latter challenges have been successful in the Court,
there is one class of newer challenges the Court has recently refused to
consider-challenges to methodology.11
Although this subject has received considerable attention in the
lower courts,1 2 only one methodology case appealed to the Supreme
Court has been granted certiorari. 3 However, the Court has decided
several challenges to the death penalty brought on other grounds.' 4 In
fact, the last time the Supreme Court considered a challenge to method-
ology, was in 1890-in In re Kemmler.15 That case involved a chal-
lenge to electrocution, and the Court held that electrocution was not
cruel or unusual. 6 Kemmler, however, is relatively out-dated and did
not formulate any definitive test for determining the constitutionality of
11. See Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2125 (1994);
Louisiana v. Glass, 455 So. 2d 659 (La. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1080 (1985).
12. See infra Parts IV and V for a discussion of lower court decisions on methodology.
13. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
14. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815
(1988); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Coker
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238 (1972); Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
15. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890). Wilkerson v. Utah was the first case in which
the Court mentioned the Eighth Amendment as it applies to a method of execution. 99 U.S. 130
(1878). In Wilkerson, an inmate convicted in Utah challenged the sentencing court's discretion to
choose the method of execution. The trial court had chosen shooting, as it was the traditional
method, and the Supreme Court noted in dicta that shooting is not unconstitutional cruel
punishment. See id. at 136-37. Wilkerson is cited for the proposition that the firing squad is not
unconstitutional, but I have not included it in the "test" as it adds nothing to discussion of how
courts should analyze cases brought under the Eighth Amendment. In addition, although often
cited as a methodology case, Resweber did not actually involve a challenge to the electrocution
method itself. 329 U.S. at 459. See infra Part III for a discussion of this case.
16. See Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 449. Kemmler was actually an appeal brought under the 14th
Amendment. Kemmler, who had challenged the constitutionality of electrocution under the New
York Constitution's cruel and unusual punishments clause, lost on this issue in the New York
courts. See id. at 438. The case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court on the grounds
that the privileges and immunities and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibited a state from imposing cruel and unusual punishments. See id. at 446. Kemmler's
arguments rested mainly on the unusualness of the punishment. See id. The Supreme Court held
the Eighth Amendment inapplicable to the states through the due process clause or the privileges
and immunities clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 446-49.
However, in subsequent Eighth Amendment challenges, the Court has assumed the
Amendment applies to the states. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 239; Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86
(1958). This assumption actually began with Resweber. 329 U.S. at 463-64, 475-77 (eight
Justices assumed the Eighth Amendment was applicable to the states). Even though Resweber did
not present the question of electrocution's constitutionality under the Eighth Amendment, the
Court, in dicta, considered this question in Kemmler, and concluded that electrocution could not
be called cruel or unusual. 136 U.S. at 449. In Kemmler, the Court stated that for a punishment to
be cruel, it must involve torture or a lingering death, and must be "something more than the mere
extinguishment of life." Id. at 447. In spite of the real grounds for the decision, Kemmler is
treated as Supreme Court authority on the constitutionality of electrocution.
1997]
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a method. 17
In other types of death penalty challenges, though, the Court has
consistently considered the same factors relevant in deciding the consti-
tutionality of a punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 8 The first
such factor is the historical acceptance of the punishment: Was the pun-
ishment accepted at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights? The
second factor is whether the punishment comports with evolving stan-
dards of decency, as measured by objective indicia of contemporary
norms and societal values. These objective indicia mainly include evi-
dence of legislative attitudes towards a particular punishment: legisla-
tive trends, evidence of the number of states employing the penalty, and,
to a lesser extent, the laws of other Western nations. The third factor the
Court has considered is whether the punishment comports with the "dig-
nity of man." Punishments which involve unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain offend human dignity, as do those that disrespect the
body or the person by mutilating or causing violence to the body. Such
punishments fail to accord a condemned prisoner the respect due a fel-
low human.
In this Comment, I will argue that these standards can and should
also apply to methodology review. Using the three factors stated above
(the "standard"), every method of execution employed today is unconsti-
tutional, with the possible exception of lethal injection.
After a brief general history of the cruel and unusual punishments
clause and the death penalty, I will explain the evolution and applicabil-
ity of this test by examining Supreme Court precedent. Part I will
examine the history and development of the cruel and unusual punish-
ments clause. Part II will examine the Supreme Court cases considering
the Eighth Amendment, illustrating the evolution and content of the
standard, and why it should apply to methodology review. Part III will
examine each of the five methods in use today in the United States-
electrocution, firing squad, lethal gas, hanging, and lethal injection-
under the standard. Part IV examines two recent Ninth Circuit deci-
sions, Campbell v. Wood and Fierro v. Gomez, which reach incongruous
results. Finally, Part V discusses lethal injection, and considers possible
future challenges to it based on analogies to the medical profession.' 9
17. See infra Part III for a discussion of how these cases work into "the standard."
18. In the context of some Eighth Amendment challenges, such as those to proportionality,
other factors may be relevant. See, e.g., Martin R. Gardner, Executions and Indignities-An
Eighth Amendment Assessment of Methods of Inflicting Capital Punishment, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 96,
113-15 (1978) (noting that in the case of proportionality review, a court should consider
penological justifications).
19. One of these cases was appealed to the Supreme Court. See Fierro v. Gomez, 865 F.
[Vol. 51:445
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II. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS
CLAUSE AND THE DEATH PENALTY
The cruel and unusual punishments clause has its origins in the
British Bill of Rights of 1689 and was incorporated by the framers of the
United States Constitution into the Eighth Amendment, adopted in
1791.20 The British interpretation of the clause was much different from
the interpretation courts give it today, and even from the interpretation
the framers attached to the clause.21 In England, the clause was meant to
prohibit punishments excessive to the crime, not torturous or barbaric
punishments.22 In contrast, the framers intended the clause to prevent
not excessive punishments, but inhumane and gory punishments, such as
those which were common to seventeenth century continental Europe.23
Some punishments widely considered today as cruel and unusual
were not seen as such in the framers' time. This shift is partly due to the
changing role of punishment in our criminal justice system.24  Punish-
ment, historically one of the most visible parts of the penal system, grad-
ually became the most hidden, as the trial and conviction became the
public part of the criminal justice process.2 5 A growing respect for the
body and for human dignity also led to a shift in the purpose of punish-
ment. No longer was the goal to revenge and deter, in the process caus-
ing pain, but rather to revenge and deter, and in the process cause no
Supp. 1387 (N.D. Cal. 1994), affd 77 F.3d 1301 (9th Cir. 1996), vacated and remanded, 117 S.
Ct. 285 (1996); see also notes 207-19 and accompanying text.
20. See Anthony F. Granucci, Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted: The Original
Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 840 (1969).
21. The American framers apparently thought the British intended the clause as a prohibition
on cruel punishments, and incorporated it into the U.S. Constitution with this interpretation in
mind. Granucci, supra note 20, at 842. The Supreme Court eventually held the clause to be a
prohibition on excessive punishments as well as a prohibition on torturous punishments. See
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
22. See generally Granucci, supra note 20.
23. See id. at 860-65. Such punishments include drawing and quartering, burning alive, and
public executions. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE
PRISON (Alan Sheridan trans., 1978).
24. See FOUCAULT, supra note 23, at 9.
25. See id. at 9. Originally, because of the low value placed on human life in a non-industrial
economy the body was dispensable, and very little dignity was accorded it. See id. at 54. Pain
was a necessary element of punishment, and post-mortem mutilations were common. See id. at
43. Public executions were put on to act as deterrents and to show the dissymmetry between the
sovereign and the subjects. See id. at 54. Public executions, though, to be effective, needed the
participation of the people, but eventually the crowds of on-lookers became agitated with
sympathy for the accused, as often the poorest received the harshest sentences. See id. at 60.
Once the state realized this, executions were moved indoors; it even became a crime in France for
witnesses to describe the scene of an execution. See id. at 15. There is some debate today about
whether televised executions would cause the same effects. See generally WENDY LESSER,
PICTURES AT AN EXECUTION (1993).
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pain, or at least as little as possible. 6 In the death penalty context, this
meant that loss of life alone became the intent of the law. 7 Supreme
Court decisions interpreting the Eighth Amendment in death penalty
cases reflect changing attitudes towards punishment. Consequently, the
Court has placed limits on the amount of pain that may be inflicted, on
the class of people on whom the penalty may be applied, and on the
crimes it can be used to punish.28
III. USING THE CASES TO ARRIVE AT THE STANDARD
Although Supreme Court death penalty jurisprudence rarely con-
tains a unanimous opinion as to the result of a particular challenge, the
Justices have followed the same basic framework in their analysis of
various types of Eighth Amendment challenges- those to proportional-
ity, those to the constitutionality of the penalty itself, and those to the
class of people on whom the penalty may be constitutionally imposed.
A closer look at the opinions reveals that the test is composed of essen-
tially three parts. First is the historical inquiry: was the punishment
considered cruel and unusual in the framers' time?
A. Historical Inquiry
An examination of Supreme Court case law indicates that the his-
torical test is still the initial inquiry. In the 1972 case of Furman v.
Georgia, the Court held that the death penalty was unconstitutional.29
26. See FOUCAULT, supra note 23, at 11. Along with social advances came a more
industrialized economy which relied much more on the body as the means of production.
Therefore, the body became more respected, and was seen less as an object on which to inflict
pain and mutilation.
27. See id. at 13. The state, instead of flaunting the execution and taking pride in it, now
viewed it as shameful and something from which to keep its distance. See id. at 9. This may
account for government reluctance to allow televised executions. In addition to the possibility of
provoking the audience with sympathy for the condemned, the state does not want its role as
executioner publicized.
Some studies have shown that the public, although in favor of the death penalty in theory,
becomes less enthusiastic when confronted with, for example, being on a sentencing jury and
having the option to recommend the penalty. See Neil Vidmar and Phoebe Ellsworth, Public
Opinion and the Death Penalty, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1245 (1974). In theory, if members of the
public witness a live execution attendant with all of its indignities, they may become less in favor
of the penalty. But see Peter S. Adolf, Killing Me Softly: Is the Gas Chamber, or Any Other
Method of Execution, "Cruel and Unusual Punishment?", 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 815, 855
n.206 (1995) (noting that televised executions might actually have the effect of promoting
disrespect for human life: "If violent television programs have the dramatic effects that many
people think they do on human behavior, imagine what effect authentic state-sanctioned violence
may have").
28. See infra Part III for a discussion of the major caselaw.
29. 408 U.S. 238. Furman invalidated Georgia's death penalty statute on the grounds that the
large amount of discretion allowed in imposing the punishment led to arbitrary imposition. The
judgment affected almost all state death penalty statutes then on the books, as they all allowed
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Although Justice Brennan's concurrence treats the historical test as if it
were outmoded,3" the four dissenting Justices-later to become a major-
ity in overturning Furman-agreed that the historical inquiry was still
viable. Capital punishment was authorized in the framers' time, and as
no one had shown that the current execution methods were any more
cruel than those historically used, the dissenters believed there was no
reason to hold the death penalty cruel and unusual.3 1  Four years after
Furman, in Gregg v. Georgia, seven Justices voted to overturn
Furman.32 The plurality opinion by Justice Stewart also looked first to
the death penalty's historical acceptance in the common law. 3 Ten
years later, in Ford v. Wainv'right,34 in holding that execution of the
insane is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment, 35 the Court stated that
there is now "little room for doubt" that the Eighth Amendment bans
punishments and modes of execution that were cruel and unusual in the
framers' time. 36 Thus, the Court, in determining the constitutionality of
such executions, again looked to the historical inquiry and considered
whether there was a common law prohibition on executing the insane."
Finally, in Penry v. Lynaugh,38 in holding that it was not cruel and unu-
sual punishment to execute a mentally retarded individual,39 the Court
first looked to whether there was a historical common law prohibition on
executing the mentally retarded.40
The historical inquiry is especially relevant to methodology review.
similar amounts of discretion. See id. at 411. The Court was divided on the issue-each Justice
writing a separate opinion-with five Justices voting to hold the penalty unconstitutional.
30. See id. at 265-66. Brennan argued that if the framers' only intended to forbid those
punishments that were cruel and unusual in their time, the clause would be superfluous, as society
presumably would not have retained these punishments anyway. See id. at 268. The sole function
of the clause would be to "legitimize advances already made by the other departments and
opinions already the conventional wisdom." Id.
31. See id. at 382.
32. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
33. See id. at 169-71.
34. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
35. Id. Four Justices joined the majority opinion; two others concurred in the result, and two
dissented. See id. Ford involved a challenge to Florida's procedures for determining sanity of
death row prisoners. The Court held that the procedures did not provide adequate assurance of
sanity, and simultaneously created a substantive right under the Eighth Amendment not to be
executed while insane. See id. at 418.
36. Id. at 405.
37. See id. at 408.
38. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
39. Id. at 335. Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the majority as to that part of the
decision holding the sentence not cruel or unusual.
40. Id. at 331-33. Penry did not come within the class of people historically protected: At
common law, those who could not appreciate the wrongfulness of their actions could not be
executed. Penry did not fall within this historically protected class, however, because he had been
found competent to stand trial and knew the "difference between good and evil." Id. at 332.
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Methods of punishment were the principal concern of the framers in
adopting the Eighth Amendment.4 1 The framers wanted to prohibit pun-
ishments that were torturous and barbaric, not necessarily to create a
prohibition against whom a punishment may be imposed or to prohibit
punishments excessive to the crime. Thus, in adopting the Eighth
Amendment, the framers primarily wanted to control and limit method-
ology. As such, whether the framers would have approved of an execu-
tion method is particularly relevant in methodology review and should
be an initial inquiry in determining any method's constitutionality under
the Eighth Amendment. If a method of execution was considered cruel
and unusual in their time, it should be held cruel and unusual in our
time. However, as shown below, Supreme Court death penalty cases
illustrate that if a punishment was not historically "cruel and unusual,"
then a court should go on to determine whether the punishment com-
ports with "evolving standards of decency. 42
B. Evolving Standards
In Weems v. United States,43 the Supreme Court held that the
Eighth Amendment prohibited punishments which were excessive to the
crime.4" While the punishment at issue in Weems may not have always
been considered harsh for the crime in question, the Court stated that as
times change, so must the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment.
"[Iln the application of a constitution ... our contemplation cannot be
only of what has been, but of what may be."4 5 In the later case of Trop
v. Dulles,46 the Court stated that "[t]he Amendment must draw its mean-
ing from evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society."47 Death penalty challenges since Trop have continu-
41. See supra Part II for a discussion of the framers' interpretation of the cruel and unusual
punishments clause.
42. For a discussion of lower courts following the Supreme Court's lead in considering this
the next inquiry, see infra Part V.
43. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). Weems involved an appeal from a punishment imposed by a
Philippine court. The punishment-"cadena"--consisted of fifteen years imprisonment with hard
labor followed by constant surveillance by the authorities-all for the crime of falsifying public
records. Id. at 358. The Eighth Amendment was not yet applicable to the states, but the Court
held that the federal legislative prohibition in the Philippines on cruel and unusual punishment
should be interpreted in the same way as the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment. Id. at 367.
44. Id. at 382. The Court stated, "[t]ime works changes, brings into existence new conditions,
and purposes. Therefore, a principle[,] to be vital[j must be capable of wider application than the
mischief which gave it birth." Id. at 373.
45. Id.
46. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
47. Id. at 101.
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ally looked at these evolving standards. 8 To the Court, evolving stan-
dards of decency mainly constitute legislative trends towards (or away
from) a punishment, and the number of states using it. 49
For example, in cases challenging the proportionality of a punish-
ment under the Eighth Amendment, the Court has considered national
and international legislation as a strong indicator of evolving standards.
In Trop, a case which held denationalization to be a punishment exces-
sive to the crime, only two other nations imposed denationalization as a
punishment.50 The Court determined that this international near-consen-
sus against the punishment was persuasive evidence of its excessive-
ness. 1 In Coker v. Georgia, the Court held that imposition of the death
penalty for the crime of rape was disproportionate to the crime, and thus
unconstitutional. 52 The majority opinion in Coker looked first at the leg-
islative response to Furman: Of sixteen states that had previously
authorized the death penalty for rape, only three reenacted those statutes
post-Furman, and none of the states that did not authorize the penalty
for rape pre-Furman did so post-Furman.53 Georgia was the only juris-
diction authorizing the death penalty for the rape of an adult woman.54
The Court conceded that the jurisdictions' disapparoval was not unani-
mous, but the fact that a majority of states did not authorize the death
penalty for rape, coupled with the trend away from such an authoriza-
tion, "weigh[ed] very heavily on the side of rejecting capital punishment
as a suitable penalty for raping an adult woman. 55 Thus, the Court in
Trop and Coker looked at the same indicator of evolving standards-
legislation. 6
In cases challenging the penalty itself, legislation is again treated as
48. See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972).
49. See infra notes 62-64.
50. 356 U.S. at 103.
51. See id.
52. 433 U.S. at 600.
53. Id. at 594.
54. See id. at 595-96. Two other jurisdictions authorized it for the rape of a child. Id. at 596.
55. Id. Similarly, Burger's dissent first looked to legislative judgments, but went beyond the
legislation of the recent past to consider pre-Furman days, when more than one-third of states
authorized the penalty for rape. Id. at 614 (Burger, J., dissenting). Burger would have held that
although legislation is the correct thing to consider in death penalty challenges, the figures could
not be read to support the conclusion that there is nationwide disapproval of the punishment. Id.
at 615. I would disagree with this. Over two-thirds of the states rejected the punishment, and
there was a clear legislative trend away from it. This, under the standard, is more than sufficient
to indicate a legislative consensus against it.
56. The Coker Court also looked at the actions of sentencing juries, noting that nine out of ten
times sentencing juries declined to impose the penalty in rape cases. 433 U.S. at 597. See infra
note 70 for a discussion of why the actions of sentencing juries are not necessarily currently
relevant in methodology review.
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the primary indicia of values. This can be seen from majority opinions
in cases such as Penry,57 and Thompson v. Oklahoma.58 It can also be
seen in Burger's dissent in Furman: Legislative judgments are pre-
sumed in these cases to embody "basic standards of decency prevailing
in the society," and are the most trustworthy indicators of contemporary
standards.5 9 Forty states having retained their death penalty statutes,
plus the fact that Congress had added to the list of federal crimes punish-
able by death, was sufficient proof to the dissenters that the punishment
of death itself was not cruel and unusual.60 Powell's Furman dissent
similarly stated that interpretation of the Eighth Amendment must be
progressive, and that in a democracy, the first indicator of public atti-
tudes is the actions of chosen representatives.6 1 Ironically, legislative
indicators, overlooked by the concurrences in Furman, obtained new
importance in Gregg, which used the legislative response to Furman to
overrule that case. Post-Furman, thirty-five state legislatures enacted
new death penalty statutes authorizing the penalty for murder. To the
Gregg majority, this was an important indicator of evolving standards,
sufficient for the majority to find that the death penalty comported with
evolving standards.62
In cases challenging to whom the death penalty may be constitu-
tionally applied, the Court also considers legislation to be an important
indicator of evolving standards and, thus, an important factor in deter-
mining the constitutionality of the penalty's application. The Ford
majority treated the fact that no state statute permitted execution of the
insane as almost dispositive evidence of a national consensus against
it.63 Two years later, in Thompson v. Oklahoma,64 a three Justice plural-
ity held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited imposition of the death
penalty for a crime committed when the defendant was under sixteen at
57. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989).
58. 487 U.S. at 830, 838.
59. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 384-85 (1972) (Burger, J., dissenting).
60. See id. at 385. "Nor is it a punishment so roundly condemned that only a few aberrant
[state] legislatures have retained it on the statute books." Id. Burger also looked at the actions of
sentencing juries and public opinion polls. See id. See infra note 72 for a discussion of why
public opinion polls should be given little weight in death penalty review.
61. Id. at 437 (Powell, J., dissenting). Powell agreed with Burger that forty states' retention
of the penalty, and Congress' addition to the list of federal death penalty crimes, shows that the
penalty was widely accepted. Id. at 437.
62. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 (1976).
63. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408-09 (1986). At the time, of forty-one states with
death penalty statutes, twenty-six expressly required competence for execution, a few others had
adopted the common law rule against execution while incompetent by judicial decision, some had
discretionary statutory procedures allowing for the suspension of the sentence if the prisoner was
found incompetent, and the four remaining had not repudiated the common law rule. Id. at 408
n.2.
64. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
[Vol. 51:445
FIVE UNDER THE EIGHTH
the time of his or her offense.65 By looking at state laws, most of which
set minimum ages at sixteen and above, and legislation of Western Euro-
pean countries that "share our Anglo-American heritage," the Court con-
cluded that such executions were contrary to evolving standards of
decency .6
6
Finally, in Penry v. Lynaugh, the majority considered state legisla-
tion to be the "clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contem-
porary values."67 Two states banning the execution of retarded persons
provided insufficient evidence of a national consensus for such execu-
tions to be contrary to evolving standards.68
As the above discussion indicates, the most important evidence of
society's values regarding a punishment is state legislative judgments,
and secondarily the laws of other Western nations. In Coker almost all
states had rejected the punishment, as did the Court; in Penry, nearly all
states accepted the punishment, and the Court held the penalty's imposi-
tion constitutional;69 and in Gregg, over two-thirds of states had death
penalty statutes on the books, and the Court upheld the death penalty as
constitutional. 70  Thus, a lower court, when considering a challenge to
65. Id. at 838.
66. Id. at 830, 838. To determine whether execution of juveniles was constitutional, the
Court considered the culpability of a juvenile as compared to an adult, and whether imposition of
the death penalty would further the penalty's social purposes. Id. at 833-35. The Court decided
that most juveniles would not have the reasoning capacity to make the cost-benefit analysis that
would deter them from committing capital crimes, so imposing the death penalty on them has little
penological justification. Id. at 834-38.
The Court also considered international legislation. Thompson's plurality opinion stated that
the relevance of international judgments in determining evolving standards had been recognized in
Trop and Coker. Id. at 830 n.31. At the time, most other Western nations retaining the death
penalty rarely authorized its use on juveniles. Id. at 830-31.
The majority conceded that most state legislatures had not expressly set a minimum age, but
in the eighteen that did, the minimum age was at least sixteen. Id. at 829. Justice O'Connor's
concurrence similarly noted that the nineteen states which say nothing about a minimum age do
not necessarily approve of the practice. Id. at 850. (O'Connor, J., concurring). She added that the
eighteen that do set an age to the nineteen that do not to determine that two-thirds of states did not
authorize the penalty for juveniles.
67. 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989).
68. See id. at 334. O'Connor also stated that public opinion polls are relevant insofar as they
find expression in legislation, which is reliable objective evidence of a national consensus. See id.
at 335.
69. The Penry Court dealt with negative evidence: Only two states expressly prohibited
executing mentally retarded persons, so by implication thirty-four states allowed it, compared to a
total of sixteen states that disallowed it. Id. at 334. However, one can turn that argument around
and argue that no state expressly allowed such executions, so, by implication, no state approved it.
This is the argument the Thompson majority used: Many states were silent regarding the
execution of minors; therefore, these "silent states" were counted in the number of states that
prohibited the execution of juveniles, leading the Court to conclude that the majority of states
disapproved of juvenile executions. 487 U.S. at 829.
70. The Court often mentions the importance of considering jury actions, but in the context of
methodology review, jury behavior is not as relevant. Juries do not recommend a method; they
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the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment, should look at evolving
standards of decency as indicated primarily by trends in state legislation.
Nearly unanimous disapproval is not required to hold that a punishment
fails the test, but a majority of states rejecting a punishment is very per-
suasive. 71 When coupled with other evidence, such as trends away from
the use of a particular punishment, it should be held unacceptable to
contemporary norms.72
The evolving standards of decency prong should be the next step in
methodology review. Assuming a method was in existence and
accepted when the Eighth Amendment was adopted, so that it passes the
historical inquiry, or was not in use, so the historical inquiry is inappli-
recommend the death penalty itself. The state prescribes the method. When juries refuse to
impose the death penalty in a significant number of cases, an important fact in the Furman
decision, courts infer that the juries did not approve of the penalty itself-not that the juries did
not approve of the method. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 314 (1972).
A similar inference can be drawn in methodology review. If the rate of imposition of the
death penalty in a certain state is much lower than in other states which employ a different
method, it can be argued that the juries are expressing disapproval of the method. However, it is
unlikely that a court would look seriously at jury behavior in a methodology case, as jury actions
in other types of death penalty challenges have not been taken very seriously by the Supreme
Court. See, e.g., Penry, 492 U.S. at 334-35 (the Court did not consider jury actions); Gregg v,
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182 (1976) (the infrequency of the death penalty's imposition-it was
imposed in only about 10% of cases where it was available- did not mean it had been rejected in
light of its strong legislative acceptance). It seems jury actions are now used primarily to bolster
an already strong evolving standards argument based on legislation. See e.g., Thompson, 487 U.S.
at 832-33; Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (jury actions used as an added argument to
legislative rejection).
71. In some ways, cases such as Ford and Thompson illustrate how the numbers can come out
differently depending on what a court considers to be the relevant statutes. In Ford, all of the state
statutes that said anything about executing the insane did not permit it; even though there were
only twenty-six statutes disallowing such executions, this number, plus the common law
prohibition against executing the insane, was enough to conclude that a legislative consensus
existed against it. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408-09 n.2 (1986). In Thompson, less than
one half of states set a minimum age, but the Court decided that the only relevant statutes were
those that expressly set some age requirement. 487 U.S. at 829. In the context of methodology
review, however, the relevant statutes in determining legislative judgments will not necessarily
run into these problems. Every state with the death penalty expressly authorizes a certain method
or a default method. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text. Therefore, the relevant statutes
are those of states with a death penalty statute.
72. The Court occasionally has mentioned public opinion polls in the context of the evolving
standards inquiry. However, such polls are given little weight. Marshall's concurrence in Furman
stated that polls are not very useful in the evolving standards inquiry, because people are generally
uninformed about the death penalty's purposes and liabilities. 408 U.S. at 361-62 (Marshall, J.,
concurring). Burger's dissent in Furman also mentioned polls, but without intimating that any
"judicial reliance could ever be placed on them." Id. at 386-87 (Burger, J., dissenting). In Penry,
O'Connor expressly repudiated that polls can have any weight: Penry offered poll evidence
showing that more than two-thirds of the public opposed the execution of the mentally retarded.
492 U.S. at 334-35. Unmoved, O'Connor stated that such polls must wait to find expression in
legislation, "which is an objective indicator of contemporary values upon which we can rely." Id.
at 335.
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cable, the next step in determining whether a method is cruel and unu-
sual is to determine how society views it: Would most people consider
it cruel and unusual? The best way to determine this is to consider how
the peoples' elected representatives have acted with respect to a particu-
lar punishment. Whether state legislatures have adopted a method,
rejected it, or simply let it remain in place, is a good indicator of how
that state's voters view that punishment. Also relevant is how other
Western nations view the method. If only one jurisdiction in the U.S.
employs a particular method of execution, and no other Western nation
which retains the death penalty employs that method, this is a good indi-
cation that the particular method should be disfavored in the U.S. as
well. The evolving standards of decency inquiry is relevant and useful
in evaluating the constitutionality of a method and should be the next
step in analyzing any challenge under the Eighth Amendment.
C. Dignity
The last and most important part of the analysis when dealing with
death penalty review is "dignity," which includes a prohibition on
unnecessary pain as well as a concern for the integrity of the body and
the person.73 The Eighth Amendment prohibition on unnecessary pain
has its origins in Kemmler and Resweber. In Kemmler, the Court stated
that a punishment may be cruel and unusual if it is "something more
than the mere extinguishment of life."' 74 "Punishments are cruel when
they involve torture or a lingering death. 75 In Kemmler, the Court
noted that New York's electrocution statute was passed in an effort to
find a more humane method of execution than hanging, the previous
method in New York, and that it (the Court) would presume the New
York legislature had evidence indicating that electrocution was more
humane.76 In Resweber, the Court expanded on this desire that a method
of execution be humane by stating that the Eighth Amendment forbade
the infliction of unnecessary and wanton pain.77 In Furman and Gregg,
73. "The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of
man." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
74. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890). See supra note 16 for a discussion of the facts
of the case. New York was the first state to adopt electrocution. See Far Worse Than Hanging,
N.Y. TimEs, Aug. 7, 1890, at 1.
75. Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447.
76. Id.
77. See 329 U.S. at 463. Resweber involved a prisoner sentenced to die in Louisiana's
electric chair. In the state's first attempt at electrocution, the electrical current was insufficient to
kill the prisoner, due to mechanical difficulty. Id. at 460. The inmate was returned to prison and a
new warrant was issued. Id. After the new warrant was issued, the inmate filed for an injunction
to stop Louisiana from electrocuting him again. He claimed that to be electrocuted twice would
deny him due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, as it would violate the Eighth
Amendment's cruel and unusual punishments clause. Id. at 461. The Court rejected the claim,
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the Court again mentioned pain as a factor in determining whether a
method is undignified.78
As the Court has not looked at the amount of pain involved in a
method since Kemmler,79 there is very little precedent as to the amount
of pain that will make it "unnecessary," or the relevant factors in such a
determination. In Kemmler, the Court gave weight to the fact that elec-
trocution was adopted by the New York legislature as a humane alterna-
tive to hanging, and that it was supposedly comparatively painless and
instantaneous. 80  Powell's dissent in Furman similarly noted that the
prohibition on unnecessary pain assumes "no court would approve any
method of implementation of the death sentence found to involve unnec-
essary cruelty in light of presently available alternatives. 8 1 Both state-
ments indicate that relevant factors in determining the necessity of pain
involved in a method include the pain inherent in the method itself,
especially when compared with available alternatives, and the length of
time it takes before unconsciousness occurs.
That dignity includes something more than a prohibition on unnec-
essary pain is apparent even from earlier Eighth Amendment cases.8 2 In
Estelle v. Gamble,83 the Court stated that the Amendment incorporates
"broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity,
and decency .... "' In Furman, Brennan said dignity meant that the
clause "prohibits the infliction of uncivilized and inhuman punishments.
The State, even as it punishes, must treat its members with respect for
holding that to be electrocuted twice was not cruel or unusual. However, Burton's dissent shed
some light on the Court's exact interpretation of "unnecessary and wanton." In Kemmler, the
Court stressed that the chair was to cause instantaneous and consequently almost painless death.
Id. at 475 (Burton, J., dissenting). Thus, in order not to involve unnecessary pain, "[a] punishment
shall be reduced, as nearly as possible, to no more than that of death itself." Id. at 474.
78. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 392-93
(1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
79. In Resweber, the Court assumed the constitutionality of electrocution, so the only issue
was whether being electrocuted twice was cruel and unusual. 329 U.S. at 464.
80. 136 U.S. at 447. Although the holding of Kemmler should no longer be given
precedential weight as many of its underlying factual suppositions have not withstood the test of
time, that case can still give some guidance in determining how to assess a method of execution
under the cruel and unusual punishments clause.
81. 408 U.S. at 430 (Powell, J., dissenting).
82. For a discussion of Trop and dignity see supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
83. 429 U.S. 97 (1976). Estelle involved an inmate who claimed that while in prison, he was
denied adequate medical treatment. The prisoner injured his back on a work assignment, and
prison doctors examined him and gave him some time off. Id. at 100. One of the doctors
recommended he return to work before he had fully recovered; shortly after being forced to work
again, he was hospitalized. Id. at 101. The Court held that in this context, a deliberate
indifference to medical needs would violate the Eighth Amendment; however, here the inadequate
treatment was due to negligence which did not violate the cruel and unusual punishments clause.
Id. at 104-05.
84. Id. at 102 (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cit. 1968)).
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their intrinsic worth as human beings.""5 Barbaric punishments were
not condemned only because they were painful, but also because they
treated "members of the human race as non-humans" and were contrary
to the underlying premise of the clause. 6 In Gregg, the plurality also
accorded dignity an important part in the analysis, stating that a punish-
ment should not be excessive or involve unnecessary pain.87 The con-
cept of dignity underlying the Eighth Amendment has come to subsume
a concern for the dignity of the person, as well as a prohibition on
unnecessary pain.
The dignity prong is especially relevant in methodology review, in
that the factors relevant to dignity-pain and violence to the person-
should be great concerns in how the state employs execution. Indeed,
concern with limiting the amount of pain in an execution is rooted in
Kemmler, the Court's only methodology case. Concerns about violence
to the body-the second prong in the dignity analysis-should also play
a large role in methodology review, due to the possible violence, mutila-
tion, and degradation involved in many methods of execution. 8 Thus,
the dignity prong is a logical and necessary step in assessing a method's
constitutionality under the cruel and unusual punishments clause.
D. Summary
In methodology cases, courts should employ a three-step analysis.
First, assuming the method was in existence at the framers' time, was it
historically accepted? Currently, the answer to this question will be
"yes." 89 Second, does the method comport with evolving standards of
85. 408 U.S. at 270 (Brennan, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 272-73 (Brennan, J., concurring). "[E]ven the vilest criminal remains a human being
possessed of common human dignity." Id.
87. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976). In Gregg, the "something more" than mere
-infliction of pain or excessiveness was a concern that the penalty be justified: A penalty "cannot
be so totally without penological justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction of
suffering." Id. at 183. In methodology cases this "something more" is a concern with mutilation,
violence, and loss of bodily control. For a discussion of the various methods and dignity see infra
Part IV.
88. Historically, pain and a concern with mutilation and bodily integrity were subsumed
under "dignity." At a minimum, the Eighth Amendment was meant to prohibit those punishments
considered barbarous in the framers' time-some of which involved unnecessary pain and some
violence and mutilation. For a discussion of the cruel and unusual punishments clause see supra
Part II. These punishments were thought to offend human dignity because they were either
excessively painful or involved violence and mutilation. See supra Part II.
89. Both methods in use at the framers' time and still in use today-shooting and hanging-
were historically accepted. The only time this first question will come into play in the
methodology context is if a state decides to bring back the guillotine or some other ancient
practice. Then the answer will be "yes," the method was in use in the framers' time, and "no," it
was not accepted, rendering it automatically unconstitutional. Although this is unlikely-and
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decency as measured by state and possibly international legislation?9"
Third, is the method dignified? Does it involve unnecessary pain and/or
visit indignities upon the body or person?91 If it does either, it should
fail the dignity prong and, thus, even if a majority of legislatures
approve of it, it should be held unconstitutional.
Detailed analysis of the constitutionality of the various methods of
execution used today has been done before.92 However, a brief sum-
mary under the standard formulated above is warranted to facilitate later
discussion of lower court decisions.
IV. CURRENT METHODS UNDER THE STANDARD
A. Electrocution
Electrocution as a method was invented in the late 1800s,9 3 so the
historical inquiry is inapplicable. Currently it is the preferred method in
only eleven of the thirty-eight death penalty states.94 Thus, the majority
of states which retain the death penalty have chosen another method.95
In addition, many states have rejected electrocution.96
Once thought to cause almost instantaneous and painless death,97
research now is divided on this issue.98 Witness reports indicate death is
even if it does occur, it will probably be unconstitutional under at least one of the other two
prongs-it is still a possibility, so this question should remain part of the analysis.
90. See supra notes 70 and 72 regarding the relevance of the actions of sentencing juries and
public opinion polls in methodology challenges.
91. See Gardner, supra note 18, at 108-09 (discussing how the human dignity aspect of the
standard entails respect for integrity, and so prohibits mutilation of the body and unnecessary
violence during the execution); see also Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080, 1085 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[B]asic notions of human dignity command that the State minimize
'mutilation' and 'distortion' of the condemned prisoner's body").
92. See, e.g., Deborah W. Denno, Is Electrocution an Unconstitutional Method of Execution?
The Engineering of Death Over the Century, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 551 (1994); Gardner,
supra note 18.
93. See Far Worse Than Hanging, supra note 74, at 1.
94. See supra note 1 (listing statutes).
95. If one counts the states without the death penalty as an indication that these states, too,
disapprove electrocution as contrary to contemporary norms, four-fifths of states reject it.
96. See Gardner, supra note 18, at 126 n.228 (discussing how Texas and Oklahoma adopted
lethal gas as a more humane alternative to electrocution). Also, no state has moved to
electrocution from lethal injection or lethal gas. See id. at 127. As early as the first electrocution,
international disapproval was expressed. See Far Worse Than Hanging, supra note 74, at 2
(describing London newspaper reports denouncing the execution and claiming disbelief that
Americans would allow electrocution to stand).
97. See Lonny J. Hoffman, Note, The Madness of the Method: The Use of Electrocution and
the Death Penalty, 70 TEx. L. REv. 1039, 1055 (1992).
98. See Philip R. Nugent, Pulling the Plug on the Electric Chair: The Unconstitutionality of
Electrocution, 2 WM. & MARY BILL OF Rrs. J. 185, 197 (1993) (noting the amount of pain
involved has never been proven, and that it depends on the prisoner, as some people have more
resistance to the current than others and will remain conscious longer).
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likely far from instantaneous, and there may be great pain.99 In the first
electrocution, that of Kemmler in 1890, eyewitnesses reported hearing a
singeing sound, and that the flesh around Kemmler's face was bloody.
Further, the current had to be turned on twice once the executioners
determined that Kemmler was still alive after the first shock. 00 More
recent electrocutions have fared no better-repeated application of the
current is often necessary, blood seeps out of the death hood, and smoke
emanates from the condemned's head.10' These accounts indicate that
electrocution is likely very painful.
Electrocution also involves mutilation and violence to the body. In
Kemmler's electrocution, some of the medical witnesses agreed that he
was probably rendered unconscious fairly soon after the current hit, but
they were horrified none the less by the violence done to the body. 10 2
Severe burns and gaping wounds where the electrodes touch the flesh
are not uncommon.10 3 The prisoner often urinates, defecates, and vom-
its, and the skin catches fire, causing the smell of burning flesh. 104
Botched electrocutions occur with enough frequency to support a
persuasive argument that the possibility of a botch makes the method
inherently cruel and unusual. 0 5 At the Florida electrocution of Jesse
Tafero in 1991, witnesses reported seeing flames and sparks emanating
from the death hood, and four power surges were necessary to ensure
death. ' 6 It was later discovered that the probable reason for the botch
was that in place of the natural ocean sponge normally used in the head-
piece, which had worn out, prison officials used an ordinary kitchen
sponge. t0 7 Other examples of botched electrocutions include that of
Wilbert Lee Evans in Virginia in 1990. During the five minutes before
his death was pronounced, he bled profusely, drenching his shirt in
99. See Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080, 1086-87 (1985) (discussing witness reports of
electrocuted prisoners cringing and fighting the straps while the limbs contort).
100. See Far Worse Than Hanging, supra note 74, at I (describing the execution as a
"disgrace to civilization," and not just unsuccessful, but "terrible").
101. See infra notes 102-09 and accompanying text.
102. See Far Worse Than Hanging, supra note 74, at 1-2.
103. See Denno, supra note 92, at 644 (witnesses described one case where the electrode went
through to the bone).
104. See, e.g., Glass, 471 U.S. at 1086-87.
105. See Hoffman, supra note 97, at 1055-56 (recurrent shocks are so common that
electrocution has been called "death by installments"). Mechanical failures and technical mishaps
can also can make it inherently unreliable. See id. at 1057-58.
106. See id. at 1051. Tafero's electrocution is also graphically described in Denno, supra note
92, at 554-56 (describing six inch flames shooting from his head and filling the execution chamber
with smoke).
107. See Ellen McGarrahan, Kitchen Aids Come in Handy on Death Row, MiAMi HERALD, July
29, 1990, at B6. Once officials determined that the fault lay with the sponge, the Eleventh Circuit
lifted a temporary stay on electrocutions in Florida which it had issued after the Tafero execution.
Denno, supra note 92, at 675.
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These cases indicate that in many instances, several minutes elapse
before the prisoner is rendered unconscious. During this time, severe
pain may be felt. Even when unconsciousness occurs rapidly, the muti-
lation attendant in electrocution is enough to violate the dignity prong,
which in turn is enough to invalidate the method under the three-part
test. When coupled with the evidence of rejection by contemporary
society, as measured by legislation, electrocution should be held
unconstitutional. 109
B. Firing Squad
In the 1878 case of Wilkerson v. Utah, the Supreme Court noted in
dicta that the firing squad as a method of execution was not cruel or
unusual. 110 Like Kemmler, however, this case was decided prior to the
development of "the standard" and should not be dispositive of the issue
today. The firing squad was used in the framers' time, but today it is
used as the preferred method in only one state, and as an alternate
method in two others.' 1' This indicates almost unanimous legislative
consensus against the firing squad. Because the firing squad is so rarely
used, little information regarding the pain involved exists. As early as
the 1950s, however, the British Royal Commission on Capital Punish-
ment recommended against using the firing squad because it did not
ensure immediate death." 2  Some evidence suggests that competent
shooting produces relatively little pain,"13 but does mutilate the body.
Although the dignity prong may be inconclusive, under the evolving
standards prong, the firing squad should also be held unconstitutional.
108. See Deneen L. Brown, Execution Probe Sought, WASH. POST, Oct 21, 1990, at BI.
109. Kemmler should not be cited as dispositive precedent. At the time it was decided, the test
had not been fully formulated, nor did the Court have any evidence of pain. Indeed, electricity
had been developed just a few years earlier. See generally Denno, supra note 92. Denno's article
also includes an interesting discussion of the politics behind New York's adoption of the electric
chair. Once evidence regarding the pain involved in an electrocution was developed, Kemmler
was already entrenched as precedent. See Hoffman, supra note 97, at 1044-45; see also Nugent,
supra note 98, at 195 (noting that respect for Kemmler's precedential value may be waning, as
some courts have ordered evidentiary hearings regarding the pain involved in electrocution). But
see Illinois v. Stewart, 520 N.E.2d 348 (Ill. 1988) (using Kemmler as precedent to reject a
challenge to electrocution under the Eighth Amendment).
110. 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
111. See supra note 4 for a list of the state statutes. Utah's firing squad requires five volunteer
marksmen, four with live rounds and one with a blank, to shoot at a bullseye placed on the
inmate's heart. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-5.5 (1996).
112. ROYAL COMMiSSiON ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1949-1953 Report 249 (1953).
113. But incompetent shootings can cause acute pain. See Denno, supra note 92, at 689; see
also Gardner, supra note 18, at 124 (discussing possible vengeful motivations on the part of
volunteer gunmen).
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C. Lethal Gas
The gas chamber, not yet invented in the framers' time, is rare
today. Although lethal gas was once the second most popular method of
execution, only one state out of thirty-eight employs it as the sole
method with four others retaining it as an alternative. 1 4 No state has
adopted lethal gas since 1970."1 These figures show that an almost
unanimous number of states prefer other methods and that the legislative
trend is towards rejection of the gas chamber as a method of execution.
As such, lethal gas should fail the evolving standards of decency prong.
The pain and mutilation in lethal gas executions is easy to docu-
ment, as each execution is relatively predictable. 11 There is evidence of
severe pain in most executions by gas, 17 and in many such executions
the prisoner remains conscious for several minutes.' 18 Gas causes death
by asphyxiation, and the pain inherent in the method has been described
as similar to that of a heart attack." 9 Asphyxiation stimulates the ner-
vous system, which causes the condemned to urinate, defecate, drool,
and vomit.1 20 The eyes have been known to pop out, and the prisoner to
turn literally purple. 121  The toxic gas causes burns to the nose lining
and lungs, so that it feels as if the gas is burning the condemned "from
the inside out.' ' 22
The mutilation, loss of bodily control, and extreme pain which
lethal gas causes render it violative of the human dignity prong.123
Therefore, lethal gas fails two prongs under the standard, and should be
held unconstitutional.
D. Hanging
Hanging, accepted in the framers' time, was the most common
114. See supra note 2 for a list of state statutes; see also Gray v. Lucas, 710 F.2d 1048, 1060-
61 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting that Nevada, New Mexico, and North Carolina switched from lethal gas
to lethal injection).
115. See Fierro v. Gomez, 865 F. Supp. 1387, 1406 (W.D. Cal. 1994).
116. See Adolf. supra note 27, at 835.
117. See Proposed Repeal of the Death Penalty Under Federal Law: Hearings on S. 1760
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th
Cong., 2nd Sess., 21 (1968) [hereinafter 1968 Hearings] (statement of Clinton Duffy, warden of
San Quentin Prison).
118. See Gray, 710 F.2d at 1058-59 (describing the 1979 execution of Jesse Walter Bishop in
Nevada in which he gasped, lurched, and took more than ten minutes to die).
119. See id. at 1060.
120. See id.
121. See 1968 Hearings, at 21.
122. Allen Huang, 74 OR. L. REv. 995 (1995). Huang, and others, have analogized the modem
gas chamber to those used in Nazi Germany.
123. For a discussion of Fierro see infra notes 161-212 and accompanying text.
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method in use in the United States for a long time.1 24 But today, out of
forty-eight states that once employed it, only three jurisdictions retain
the practice, and none of them employ it as the sole method. 25 One
other English-speaking jurisdiction in the world-South Africa-retains
hanging. 126 Many states since the late 1700s have switched from hang-
ing to what were perceived as the more humane methods of electrocu-
tion and lethal gas. 127  An overwhelming national consensus exists
against hanging: The majority of states reject it, and the legislative trend
is to reject hanging as a method of execution. 28
A large amount of evidence documents the pain and indignity
involved in hanging. In properly-performed hangings, the neck breaks
immediately and unconsciousness is supposedly instantaneous. 129 How-
ever, hanging has been called an "art,"' 30 and considerable skill is neces-
sary to ensure that the neck breaks-this result being termed a
"hangman's fracture."'13' In most instances, however, this hangman's
fracture does not result, and the condemned dies a violent and lingering
death.' 32 If the drop is too long, the prisoner may be decapitated, 33
causing great indignity to the body. If the drop is too short, the inmate
may slowly strangle to death. In strangulation, extreme pain is evident:
the eyeballs pop out, the tongue swells and protrudes, the rope can pull
hunks of flesh off the face, and the neck elongates and distorts. 13 4  As it
124. For a discussion of Campbell v. Wood see infra notes 146-206 and accompanying text.
125. See Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 697-98 (9th Cir. 1994) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
126. See Pamela S. Nagy, Hang by the Neck Until Dead: The Resurgence of Cruel and
Unusual Punishment in the 1990s, 26 PAC. L.J. 85, 105 n.140 (1994).
127. See Gardner, supra note 18, at 122; see also In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 437, 444-45 (1890);
Nagy, supra note 126, at 117-18 (the majority of states that abandoned hanging but kept the death
penalty did so in an effort to find a more humane method).
128. See Washington v. Frampton, 627 P.2d 922, 934 (Wash. 1981) (noting this fact alone
indicates that hanging is incompatible with evolving standards of decency).
129. See Gardner, supra note 18, at 120.
130. Frampton, 627 P.2d at 936.
131. Id. at 935-36 (noting that prison authorities at the Washington State Penitentiary are
unaware of any experts on hanging in the United States).
132. See id. at 935; see also Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 712 (9th Cir. 1994) (Reinhardt,
J., dissenting) (considerable evidence exists that death in many instances results from slow
asphyxiation). According to the reports of a Welsh pathologist who performed autopsies on
hanged people, in only two of 34 cases was the cause of death a broken neck. See Ryk James and
Rachel Nasmyth-Jones. The Occurrence of Cervical Fractures in Victims of Judicial Hanging, 54
FORENSIC SCI. INT'L 81, 82 (1992).
133. See Rupe v. Wood, 863 F. Supp. 1307 (W.D. Wash. 1994). In Rupe, a 400 pound death
row inmate challenged his hanging as cruel and unusual on the grounds that under the long-drop
method--dropping the prisoner with the rope rather than letting him dangle until he strangles-
there was a very significant risk of decapitation. For a discussion of Rupe see infra notes 213-19
and accompanying text.
134. See 1968 Hearings, supra notes 117, at 21; see also Nagy, supra note 126, at 114-15
(noting that in the case of death by strangulation, the victim remains conscious for many minutes).
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is so often improperly performed, the risk of either decapitation or slow
strangulation is likely. Under both factors in the dignity prong, there-
fore, hanging is unconstitutional. This, or the evidence of the legislative
trend against it, is enough to conclude that hanging is cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
E. Lethal Injection
Texas first used lethal injection in 1982.135 Since then, twenty-
seven states have adopted lethal injection. 136 Currently, over two-thirds
of states authorize lethal injection, indicating a legislative consensus in
favor of, and a trend towards, lethal injection.1 37
By most accounts, lethal injection involves minimal pain, and there
is little apparent violence or bodily mutilation. 138 However, there is still
a risk of botched injections which can lead to incredible pain.' 39 In one
Texas case, the executioners struggled for 45 minutes to find a suitable
vein; in another, the executioner inserted the needle into a muscle
instead of a vein, causing an excruciatingly long and painful death.1 40
At present, lethal injection is widely viewed as humane when per-
formed properly,1 41  but it can be argued that the significant body of
evidence of botched injections renders the method itself inherently cruel
as violative of human dignity. 42 However, in light of its general legisla-
tive acceptance, supposed relative painlessness when correctly per-
formed as compared to other methods, and the little apparent mutilation
associated with lethal injection, it is unlikely that a court today would
135. See Don Colburn, Lethal Injection: Why Doctors are Uneasy About the Newest Method
of Capital Punishment, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 1990, at 13, 14.
136. See supra note 5 for a listing of states that employ lethal injection.
137. See infra note 225 for a discussion of Heckler v. Chaney, the only Supreme Court case to
deal even peripherally with lethal injection.
138. See Adolf, supra note 27, at 863-64 (the violence is limited to insertion of the needle, and
the fast-acting drugs administered lessen any pain); Gardner, supra note 18, at 128-29.
139. See Chaney v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (petitioners presented
substantial evidence that errors in drug dosage can lead to paralysis but not immediate death,
making the condemned the witness of his own asphyxiation), overruled by Heckler v. Chaney, 470
U.S. 821 (1985); see also Adolf, supra note 27, at 864 n.236 (recounting instances of incorrect
insertions and an inability to locate the vein).
140. See William Ecenbarger, Killing by the Book, Executions are Gruesome and Horrifying-
Just Ask the Witnesses, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 23, 1994, at 10.
141. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING AND GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
AMERICAN AGENDA 112 (1986). The authors note that lethal injection is often described as an
"ultra fast acting barbiturate," which makes it seem innocuous.
142. In Poland v. Stewart, 92 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 1996), which rejected a claim that lethal
injection was unconstitutional, the petitioner cited nine lethal injection executions involving
considerable problems finding a vein or violent reactions to the drugs. For a discussion of
attempts to use medical ethics to argue that lethal injection is contrary to evolving standards of
decency see infra notes 226-31 and accompanying text.
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hold lethal injection to be unconstitutional. 143
V. CONFLICT AMONG THE COURTS
Recent lower court decisions have been in conflict regarding the
factors to consider in methodology challenges. Consequently, lower
courts have reached opposite conclusions to the same questions. The
recent cases of Campbell v. Wood'" and Fierro v. Gomez, 4 5 both
decided by the Ninth Circuit, provide the most glaring examples. Camp-
bell held hanging constitutional, and Fierro held execution by lethal gas
unconstitutional.
A. Campbell & Fierro
In Campbell, the defendant, Charles Rodman Campbell, was con-
victed of three murders: that of a woman he had raped in 1974, and
those of her daughter and neighbor who testified against him at the rape
trial. 146 He was sentenced to death, which in Washington is done by
hanging. Campbell challenged Washington's death penalty statute on
the grounds that hanging was cruel and unusual in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. 147 Numerous stays were issued, and eventually a
federal district court held an evidentiary hearing in 1993 to consider the
constitutionality of hanging.' 48 The district court found hanging, at least
under the Washington protocol, to be constitutional, and the Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed. 149
In its analysis, the district court easily concluded that the framers of
the Bill of Rights would have found hanging to comport with the Eighth
Amendment. 5°  Rather than next considering how state legislatures
have dealt with hanging-either adopting, discarding in favor of another
method, or preserving the status quo-which would have revealed a
143. See infra note 224 (discussing cases in which lower courts rejected challenges to lethal
injection).
144. 18 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2125 (1994).
145. 77 F.3d 301 (9th Cir. 1996).
146. 18 F.3d at 668.
147. See id. at 681. Washington's statute actually provided that the prisoner could choose
lethal injection over hanging, with hanging as the default. See id. at 680. The state argued that
this made Campbell's claim non-justiciable. The Ninth Circuit decided the claim was justiciable:
"[Tlhe government may [not] cloak unconstitutional punishments in the mantle of 'choice'." Id.
To declare a claim moot because one could have chosen another course of action would foreclose
"an entire universe of claims." Id. But see Arizona v. Ross, 886 P.2d 1354 (Ariz. 1994) (holding
a challenge to lethal gas moot because the prisoner could have chosen lethal injection).
148. See Campbell, 18 F.3d at 668.
149. See id. The district court refused to accept evidence of past non-Washington protocol
hangings, leaving only one hanging to consider. See id. at 685-87. Nor did the court consider
relevant any evidence of alternative methods. See id. at 686-87.
150. See id. at 682.
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clear national consensus against it, the court determined that the only
relevant inquiry in methodology challenges was evidence of pain.'
5
'
The court refused to consider evidence the defendant offered to show
that the number of states rejecting hanging-in both trends away from it
as well as "numbers count"-indicated a national judgment that hanging
was no longer acceptable to contemporary society.152 Rather, the district
court stated that Supreme Court cases such as Coker and Thompson,
which considered legislative trends, were proportionality challenges, and
the same standards did not necessarily apply in methodology review.
153
The district court held that in methodology review, "evolving standards"
were irrelevant.' 54 Thus, the Campbell court determined that the only
relevant inquiry was evidence of pain.
Although the district court agreed that under Kemmler one is enti-
tled to an execution free of unnecessary pain, 155 the court decided that
the only relevant evidence of pain in hanging was that of hangings con-
ducted under the Washington protocol, or those that could be reliably
compared to one conducted under the Washington protocol.'
56
"[W]hether judicial hanging only as it is performed in Washington is
cruel and unusual," not whether hanging in general involves unnecessary
pain, was the relevant inquiry.1 57 Thus, in deciding the amount of pain
that would be experienced, the district court only considered the one
Washington hanging conducted according to the protocol. That hanging
was fairly quick, unconsciousness came within several seconds, and the
procedure generally worked properly.' 58 Medical experts testified that
the Washington protocol minimized the risk of death by asphyxiation
151. See id. In determining that the only relevant inquiry was unnecessary pain, the majority
relied on Brennan's dissent from denial of certiorari in Glass, where he stated that among
objective factors in determining a method's constitutionality is whether the method involves
unnecessary pain. 471 U.S. at 1084 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
152. Id.
153. See id.
154. Campbell, 18 F.3d at 682.
155. See id. at 683.
156. See id. at 683. This protocol was taken from a 1959 never-used army protocol which
described how to conduct a long drop hanging, including the appropriate drop length and rope
diameter. See id. at 683. The purpose of the long drop was to avoid strangulation and ensure
rapid severance of the spinal cord. See id. The protocol also contained discussion regarding the
treatment of the rope and the need to properly soak it to make it flexible. See id. at 685.
Apparently, the more rigid the rope the higher the risk of decapitation. See id. at 684.
Washington had employed the protocol once in the execution of Westley Allen Dodd a few years
earlier. See id. at 685.
157. Id. at 686. The majority failed to consider pain under other hangings, making it
unsurprising that it treated evidence of the painlessness of lethal injection as irrelevant to the
determination. See id. at 687.
158. See id. at 687. Witnesses to Dodd's execution testified that his body did not convulse at
all; unconsciousness was almost immediate, and certain death was pronounced within minutes.
See id. at 685.
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and decapitation, and death would usually occur rapidly.' 59 The district
court found, and the Ninth Circuit panel agreed, there was little likeli-
hood of unnecessary pain under the protocol. t6 °
The same year as Campbell, a district court in Northern California
was faced with a challenge to lethal gas. In Fierro v. Gomez, district
court Judge Marilyn Patel found the gas chamber cruel and unusual-
following the Campbell test.' 61 In 1992, three inmates at San Quentin-
David Fierro, Alejandro Ruiz, and Robert Alton Harris-acting on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, brought a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action claiming California's lethal gas chamber violated
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
162
Judge Patel rendered her decision a full year after the eight-day eviden-
tiary hearing. t6
3
The California court interpreted Campbell to say that the initial step
in methodology review was to consider objective evidence of unneces-
159. See id. at 684. The court stated that Campbell did not present sufficient evidence of risks
associated with the protocol. See id. at 687. This is hardly remarkable, as the court would only
consider the one hanging conducted under the exact Washington protocol.
160. See id. at 687. In a lengthy dissent, Judge Reinhardt, joined by three other judges,
contended that evolving standards of decency and objective evidence of pain should be
considered. See id. at 693 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). He noted that even the U.S. Army, whose
protocol the state used, abandoned the method, leaving the Ninth Circuit as the only jurisdiction
retaining hanging as the method of choice. See id. at 697-99. Also, Judge Reinhardt looked at
other hangings-not just that of Dodd-several of which were gruesome, in concluding that
hanging in general is very painful and undignified.
Judge Reinhardt also thought dignity should be part of the analysis, but his definition of
dignity differs somewhat from the bodily integrity definition I have used. Reinhardt would define
dignity as larger than this-coming from "philosophy, religion, logic, and history." Id. at 697.
He also stated that federal judges are better able to decide if a punishment violates human dignity.
See id. Although I agree that the dignity prong should consist of more than a simple pain inquiry,
it is not necessarily workable to state explicitly that judges should use their own "philosophy,
religion and logic" to decide death penalty cases, because these would differ from judge to judge.
A better, less subjective dignity analysis would focus on avoiding pain, mutilation and violence to
the body. See, e.g., Campbell v. Wood, 114 S. Ct. 2125, 2127 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (in light of the indignities that go along with the risks of hanging-
strangulation and mutilation-hanging violates human dignity).
161. See 865 F. Supp. 1387, 1403 (N.D. Cal. 1994) [hereinafter Fierro 1], aff'd, 77 F.3d 301
(9th Cir. 1996), vacated and remanded, 117 S. Ct. 285 (1996).
162. See id. at 1389-90. By the time of Fierro I, Harris had already been executed. Id. Soon
after Harris's execution, the California legislature amended its death penalty statute to allow for
lethal injection as an alternative method, with gas as the default if the inmate refused to choose
injection. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3604 (Deering 1996). The Fierro I court did not address the
issue of mootness as the Campbell court did. See supra note 147.
Harris's execution may arguably be called unconstitutional for a different reason. The night
of the execution he was placed in and out of the execution chair as the courts issued and then lifted
stays of execution. Judge Stephen Reinhardt, The Supreme Court, the Death Penalty, and the
Harris Case, 102 YALE L.J. 205, 215 (1992). This is like a form of psychological torture as
terrible as the physical pain involved.
163, See Fierro 1, 865 F. Supp. at 1389.
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sary pain involved in the challenged method; if this was not dispositive,
the next step was to consider evolving standards of decency as measured
by legislation.' 64 Evolving standards, Patel concluded, may still be part
of the analysis in methodology challenges; the Campbell court simply
did not look at legislative trends, because it found the evidence of the
minimal pain involved in hangings to be dispositive. Therefore, Judge
Patel concluded that under Campbell, if a court finds that objective evi-
dence of pain is not dispositive, a court should consider legislative
actions. 165
To determine the amount of pain in a lethal gas execution, the
Fierro court considered testimony given by both the inmates' and the
state's witnesses, execution records of the two previous executions
under the California protocol, and medical textbooks describing the
effect of cyanide gas on the body. 166 Plaintiffs' experts testified that gas
works by acting on the cells, so that the cells cannot receive oxygen.
This in turn, causes a feeling of intense suffocation and "air hunger."'' 67
While the prisoner drifts in and out of consciousness, lactic acid builds
in the cells and eventually causes acidosis, which involves pain similar
to a heart attack.' 68
To the Fierro I court, the length of the prisoner's consciousness
was very important, as the Campbell opinion had indicated conscious-
ness, while experiencing intense pain for more than a minute, would be
outside of constitutional boundaries.' 69 Both sides' experts agreed that
unconsciousness occurred prior to actual death, but disagreed as to the
time periods. Plaintiffs' experts believed it could take as long as two
minutes before the inmate became unconscious, while the defendant's
experts testified that it only took ten to thirty seconds, and that uncon-
sciousness occurred before cellular suffocation, so the prisoner felt no
pain.1
70
164. See id. at 1414.
165. See id.
166. Id. at 1396-1403.
167. Id. at 1396. The typical gas execution uses hydrogen cyanide, which is dropped into a
reservoir of acid at the base of the chair in which the inmate sits. See id.
168. See id. Experts also testified that tetany of the muscles causes a "sardonic smile" and
involuntary twisting, and that the body releases a painful discharge of adrenalin. Id. at 1396-97;
see also supra notes 114-23 and accompanying text regarding the pain involved in lethal gas
execution.
169. See Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 1994).
170. See Fierro 1, 865 F. Supp. at 1395-97. The court gave less weight to the defendant's
experts because most of their testimony was based on their own theoretical assumptions, not data
from actual executions. See id. at 1403. Interestingly, one of the defense experts, when asked
how he knew in an unrelated experiment with a rabbit that the animal was experiencing pain,
stated "you had to be there." Id. at 1404. This indicates that outward signs of pain, even if one
does not know exactly what the inmate is experiencing, can be probative.
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The scientific literature tended to support plaintiffs' theory that cya-
nide gas executions caused tetany, followed by seizure activity, as well
as a fading in and out of consciousness. 17  However, the district court
found such studies and expert testimony inconclusive, because they were
often based on anecdotal accounts of cyanide exposure in uncontrolled
circumstances involving unknown dosages.172 Therefore, the literature
and experts alone could not answer the key questions of "which effects
are felt first, and whether unconsciousness sets in quickly."'
' 7 3
The court went on to consider the San Quentin records and obser-
vations of lay witnesses for the two executions conducted under the pro-
tocol-Robert Harris in 1992 and David Mason in 1993.17' Harris
experienced apparent unconsciousness within two minutes after the gas
hit his face and certain unconsciousness one minute later. Mason exper-
ienced apparent unconsciousness approximately one minute after expo-
sure and certain unconsciousness two minutes later. 75 Movements of
both appeared to be volitional responses to pain, including clenched
fists, eye movement, and strained muscles. 176 Records of other pre-
Furman executions showed unconsciousness persisting for between fif-
teen seconds to one minute, and in some cases occurring much later.
77
In sum, the court found that inmates were not rendered immediately
unconscious, and during that time may experience extreme pain. 78
The court, however, concluded that although the San Quentin
reports and scientific evidence supported the conclusion that death was
painful, the evidence of length of consciousness was too conflicting,
making the pain inquiry inconclusive. The pain experienced was clearly
excruciating, but if only felt for several seconds, it would not be enough
to render lethal gas unconstitutional. 79 On the other hand, if the pain
were experienced for several minutes, this would be clearly unconstitu-
tional.' 80 Based on the evidence before it, the Fierro I court could not
say that the pain felt was, in itself, sufficient to hold one way or the
other. 18 Judge Patel concluded that objective evidence of contemporary
171. See id. at 1398.
172. See id.
173. Id. at 1399.
174. See id. at 1401-02. The Campbell court only considered the hanging conducted according
to the Washington protocol as relevant. Similarly, Fierro I considered the two California protocol
executions most probative. Id. at 1401; see also infra note 196.
175. See Fierro 1, 865 F. Supp. at 1402.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See id. at 1404.
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norms should be analyzed as the "tie-breaker."' 18 2
Legislative evidence showed a clear rejection of lethal gas, and
trends indicated that the abandonment of gas was even more pronounced
than the abandonment of electrocution. 8 3 Fierro I also noted that most
states discarded lethal gas in favor of lethal injection-considered the
current "state-of-the-art execution technique" and widely viewed as
more humane than any other.' 4 Fierro I concluded that evidence of
legislative rejection of lethal gas as a method of execution, coupled with
the evidence of pain, were enough to render California's protocol uncon-
stitutional under the Eighth Amendment.
B. Fierro II
Fierro I was immediately appealed to the Ninth Circuit.' That the
Ninth Circuit would hold execution by lethal gas unconstitutional, even
though only a few years earlier it held execution by hanging constitu-
tional, seemed an incongruous and almost impossible result, especially
since this would create a split in the circuits. The Fifth Circuit, in the
1983 case of Gray v. Lucas, held lethal gas constitutional,' 8 6 and in 1995
the Fourth Circuit did the same in Hunt v. Nuth. 87 Yet, a three-judge
panel affirmed Fierro I in late February of 1996.188
Fierro II essentially held that Judge Patel correctly interpreted
Campbell to require that evidence of pain be the primary inquiry in
methodology cases; if evidence of pain did not dictate a result as to
constitutionality, a court may consider evolving standards of decency as
measured by legislation.' 8 9 The Fierro H panel said in Campbell it was
unnecessary to look at legislation because it was clear that hanging
involved little pain and an extremely short period of consciousness
before death, and this was sufficient to conclude that hanging was con-
182. Id. (stating that the court would turn "to other objective indicia that the punishment is
contrary to society's civilized standards"). Interestingly, most states do not administer muscle
relaxers or heavy sedatives prior to lethal gas executions. Contrary to popular belief, this is not
what occurs at lethal injection executions either. The first drug administered in a lethal injection
is actually a muscle paralyzer. See infra note 231.
183. See Fierro L 865 F. Supp. at 1406. Only one of nine states that previously used gas as the
sole method retained it at the time of the decision. Id. See also supra note 2 for a list of states that
currently use lethal gas.
184. Fierro 1, 865 F. Supp. at 1408.
185. See Fierro v. Gomez, 77 F.3d 301 (9th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Fierro I1], vacated and
remanded, 117 S. Ct. 285 (1996).
186. 710 F.2d 1048, 1061 (5th Cir. 1983).
187. 57 F.3d 1327 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 724 (1996).
188. Fierro II, 77 F.3d at 302. None of the three judges sitting in Fierro II sat on Campbell.
Id
189. Id. at 307-08.
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stitutional.1t 0 Judge Patel correctly found the most probative evidence
to be that presented by plaintiffs' experts and that concerning the two
executions under the challenged protocol.' 9' However, the Ninth Circuit
further stated that in Fierro I, considering legislative indicators was
error because the evidence of the horrible pain involved plus the risk that
it would last for several minutes was enough to hold lethal gas unconsti-
tutional.' 92 The Ninth Circuit panel distinguished Gray and Hunt, stat-
ing that in those cases the courts did not have the benefit of extensive
execution records or expert testimony on the effects of lethal gas, both
key in Fierro L 193
A closer analysis reveals that Fierro I and II do not follow Camp-
bell as closely as Fierro I would claim. Campbell unequivocally stated
that in methodology cases, objective evidence of pain was the only
inquiry, and evolving standards were irrelevant. 94 Had the Fierro I
court been true to Campbell, it would have considered only objective
evidence of pain in gas executions. The district court would have been
190. Id. at 307.
191. See id.
192. Id. at 308.
193. See id. at 308-09. In Gray, a three judge panel of the Fifth Circuit heard Jimmy Lee
Gray's challenge to Mississippi's method of execution by lethal gas. 710 F.2d at 1057-58.
Plaintiff introduced affidavits at the evidetiary hearing of eyewitness accounts of gas executions.
See id. at 1058. These affidavits vividly described condemned inmates' protracted struggles and
convulsions and other outward indications of severe pain; the reports indicated that consciousness
continued for well over several minutes in each case. See id. at 1058-59. Gray also submitted
scientific evidence indicating gas caused painful asphyxiation, a feeling similar to a heart attack.
See id. at 1060.
The court noted that several states recently abandoned lethal gas in favor of lethal injection.
See id. at 1061. However, the court denied Gray's request for an evidentiary hearing, stating that
the pain and terror involved in gas execution were no different from that involved in any
traditional method of execution, such as hanging. See id. The court conceded that perhaps
contemporary norms called for a re-evaluation of the acceptable degree of pain, but decided
Gray's evidence was insufficient to implicate the Eighth Amendment. See id.
In Hunt v. Nuth, a three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed a district court opinion
holding lethal gas constitutional. 57 F.3d 1327 (4th Cir. 1995). Flint Gregory Hunt challenged
his execution under Maryland's death penalty statute, which allowed an inmate to choose between
gas and injection, with injection as the default method. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 546.720 (West
1995). Hunt chose gas, but argued that both methods were unconstitutional, citing Fierro L See
57 F.3d at 1337-38. The court of appeals stated that it declined to become the first court to follow
Fierro 1, and that the mere existence of more humane methods did not render a contested method
cruel and unusual. See id. at 1338. The court cited Gray, and further stated that the evidence of
the pain experienced in lethal gas executions, was "calculated to invoke sympathy, but insufficient
to demonstrate that execution by the administration of gas involves the wanton and unnecessary
infliction of pain." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
194. Campbell, 18 F.3d at 682. Fierro I interpreted the language from the beginning of the
Campbell opinion regarding "objective indicators" to mean objective indicators of evolving
standards. Fierro 1, 865 F. Supp. at 1412. However, the Campbell court stated that evolving
standards as considered in cases like Coker and Thompson are irrelevant in methodology cases.
Campbell, 18 F.3d at 682-83.
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forced to find the evidence of pain dispositive, as the Ninth Circuit was
forced to do. As Judge Patel stated, after an eight-day evidentiary hear-
ing, such evidence was not dispositive; thus, the district court had to
consider evolving standards of decency. 195
Confronted with the controlling Campbell opinion stating that
evolving standards of decency are irrelevant in methodology cases, and
Fierro I having considered both factors in apparent contravention of
Campbell, the Ninth Circuit, if it wanted to uphold Fierro I, had to rec-
oncile the two cases. On this analysis, the Ninth Circuit panel did a
masterful job. Objective evidence of unnecessary pain being the only
relevant inquiry under Campbell, it had to be dispositive one way or the
other. Thus, the Ninth Circuit simply decided the evidence of pain was
dispositive.196 Therefore, the result reached in Fierro I was correct,
even if the means to the result were not.
Nonetheless, problems with and between Fierro II and Campbell
remain. First, the Campbell court should have considered evolving stan-
dards: A punishment violates the Eighth Amendment when it involves
unnecessary pain or when it offends evolving standards of decency. To
comport with the Eighth Amendment, the method must be inoffensive to
both parts. 197  Thus, only considering one prong would be sufficient if
under that prong the method was unconstitutional. In this respect, the
Fierro II court correctly held that evidence of pain alone was enough to
hold that lethal gas was cruel and unusual punishment, making it unnec-
essary to consider evolving standards. However, if under the initial
prong the answer is inconclusive, or the method is constitutional, the
other prong must be considered as well. In this respect, the Campbell
holding and standard are both incorrect.
The Supreme Court has never distinguished methodology and pro-
portionality cases; in fact, the cases reject such a distinction. 19 Had the
Campbell court considered this and further examined evolving stan-
195. Fierro 1, 865 F. Supp. at 1414.
196. See Fierro I, 77 F.3d at 308-09. Another inconsistency between the two cases is in the
evidence considered. In Campbell, the court looked at only the one hanging conducted under the
Washington protocol. 18 F.3d at 685. Therefore, in Fierro , the district court should have
considered only the two executions conducted under the California protocol. The district court,
however, considered other California executions conducted under an earlier protocol. Unless the
Fierro I court concluded that these prior executions were substantially similar to those conducted
under the current California protocol, this is another inconsistency between the two cases.
197. If pain were the only relevant question, punishments such as the guillotine and public
executions should be constitutional. Yet the Campbell majority implicitly accepted that
decapitation is unconstitutional. Campbell, 18 F.3d at 681; see also Adolf, supra note 27, at 846.
198. Gregg and Furman were both challenges to the death penalty itself, yet the Supreme
Court considered evolving standards in determining the penalty's constitutionality. Penry, Ford,
and Thompson were all challenges to the class of persons on whom the penalty could be
constitutionally imposed, and in those cases, the Court again looked at evolving standards.
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dards, it would have been confronted with an overwhelming legislative
rejection of hanging.1 99 Evidence presented in Fierro I was not as
strong, but it too was enough to hold that there was a legislative consen-
sus against the use of lethal gas.2°
Next, the Campbell court should have considered the evidence of
pain involved in hangings generally. The Washington protocol was sub-
stantially the same as other long-drop methods used throughout his-
tory, 20 1 and evidence proffered by Campbell clearly showed that the
"protocol [will] have virtuallly no effect on the risk of slow strangula-
tion. ' '202 Had the district court considered this evidence, it would have
found a much greater than slight risk of strangulation.20 3
Also, the Campbell court should have compared the pain involved
in hanging with the pain involved in other methods. It is hard to deter-
mine whether pain is necessary in an execution without looking at the
amount of pain involved in other available methods. 204 Finally, neither
court dealt with the question of dignity as it concerns bodily mutilation
or violence.20 5 Had the Ninth Circuit considered both methods under the
Therefore, contrary to the Campbell majority's assertion, evolving standards of decency are not
relevant only in proportionality cases.
199. Many agree that had the Supreme Court granted certiorari, the case probably would have
been overturned. See Nagy, supra note 126, at 127. But see Gary E. Hood, Note, Campbell v.
Wood: The Death Penalty in Washington State: "Hanging" on to a Method of Execution, 30
GONz. L. REv. 163 (1994). Wood argues that the Campbell majority made the correct decision:
Evolving standards of decency, even if the court should have looked at them, should only take into
account the consensus on a punishment of the state whose method is challenged. In Campbell, the
people of Washington obviously thought hanging was fine, as it was still on the books. Id. at 178.
However, if evolving standards of decency meant only looking at how the people in that state
whose method is being challenged view the punishment, "evolving standards" as a test would
become a worthless inquiry. Presumably the consensus, as measured by legislation, will always
be that the challenged method comports with evolving standards of decency. Otherwise, that
method would not be on the statute books.
200. Six of thirty-eight states employing lethal gas, and of those most only retaining it as an
alternate method, should have been sufficient to show it is contrary to evolving standards. Most
courts faced with the issue of gas' constitutionality have not dealt with it thoroughly, and many
simply rely on precedent. See, e.g., Brown v. Cain, 1995 WL 495890 (E.D. La. Aug. 18, 1995);
Arizona v. Greenway, 823 P.2d 22 (Ariz. 1991).
201. Campbell, 18 F.3d at 711 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 714-15; see supra note 156 (regarding the Washington protocol).
203. Judge Reinhardt noted that the evidence developed at trial indicated that death may occur
through asphyxiation. See Campbell, 18 F.3d at 712 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). He also noted
that the district court's objections to the admission of evidence of other hangings-rope length
and prisoner weight being unrecorded so it couldn't be exactly determined if the drop length and
rope width were the same as required under the protocol-were actually estimated by Campbell's
experts to be roughly the same as required under the protocol. See id. at 722. Therefore, the
district court could have reliably considered evidence from these other hangings.
204. See Campbell, 18 F.3d at 715 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting); Nagy, supra note 126, at 127-28.
But see Hood, supra note 199, at 179 (arguing that different methods do not have to be compared
to determine the pain involved in each).
205. See supra notes 124-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the indignities
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standard set out previously, it probably would have held both hanging
and gas unconstitutional.
Fierro II was appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Court granted
the petition for certiorari. On October 15, 1996, the Court vacated and
remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit.20 6 However, the Court did
not consider the constitutionality of lethal gas; it simply stated that the
case was remanded for further consideration in light of California Penal
Code Section 3604.207
After Fierro II, the California legislature amended California's
death penalty statute to provide for lethal injection as the primary
method of execution unless the defendant specifically requests the gas
chamber. 20 8 Although the Supreme Court did not elaborate, the Court
apparently believes that the question of lethal gas' constitutionality in
Fierro II is rendered moot by the adoption of lethal injection as the
preferred method in California.2 9
Two Justices dissented from the decision. They point out that
under either the new statute, or the judgment in Fierro II, Fierro and
Ruiz will be executed by lethal injection.210 Thus, the only result of
vacating the judgment will be to delay the executions, which in turn will
"frustrate[] the public interest in deterrence and eviscerat[e] the only
rational justification" for the death penalty.21
It will be interesting to see how the Ninth Circuit handles reconsid-
eration of the case. Even if that court upholds its original decision, how-
ever, it is unlikely that California's amended death penalty statute itself
will be successfully attacked on the grounds that lethal gas is
unconstitutional.21 2
The Court's handling of Fierro II leaves lower courts with as little
guidance as previously. In spite of having sidestepped the issue in
involved in hanging. Concern with human dignity answers the question why we, as a society, are
repulsed by inmates' spasms and facial expressions associated with the death penalty, even if they
appear unconscious.
206. See Gomez v. Fierro, 117 S. Ct. 285 (1996).
207. See id.
208. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3604 (West 1996).
209. This raises interesting questions. California's statute now provides that an inmate may
choose lethal gas. See id. Lethal gas has been held unconstitutional by the Ninth Circuit. Thus,
whether an inmate may choose to be executed by an unconstitutional method is a question that is
bound to arise in California, as indeed it already has elsewhere. In a recent case which challenged
Arizona's death penalty statute, also providing for a choice between lethal gas and lethal injection,
the Ninth Circuit held without much discussion that if an inmate chooses to be executed by lethal
gas he has waived the protections of the Eighth Amendment. See Poland v. Stewart, 92 F.3d 881
(9th Cir. 1996). For a further discussion of Poland v. Stewart, see infra note 224.
210. See Gomez, 117 S. Ct. at 286 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 285.
212. See notes 209 and 224.
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Fierro, however, the Supreme Court will likely be faced with the consti-
tutionality of gas or other methods in the near future. A review of sev-
eral other lower court decisions will further illustrate the need for such
review.
C. Other Challenges
One of the most recent cases, Rupe v. Wood, involved the hanging
of an inmate weighing over four-hundred pounds, who challenged the
execution on the grounds that the long-drop method employed was sig-
nificantly more likely to cause decapitation in obese people.21 3 The dis-
trict court considered the correct standard by distinguishing the issue in
Campbell from the issue in Rupe: Rupe's case involved substantial risk
of decapitation, while Campbell's involved minimal risk.21 4 Thus, the
issue was not whether hanging itself was unconstitutional under the pro-
tocol, but whether the protocol violated the Eighth Amendment as it
related to Rupe: was hanging with a substantial risk of decapitation
unconstitutional? 21 5
The Rupe court further analyzed evolving standards and dignity as
they related to hanging with a substantial possibility of decapitation.2"6
"Public attitudes toward hangings that might carry a slight risk of decap-
itation cannot be equated with public attitudes toward hangings that
carry a significant risk of decapitation. 21 7 In short, the court considered
most of the relevant factors under the standard, but only by side-stepping
Campbell. The district court concluded that hanging in Rupe's case
would fail the test and violate the Eighth.2"'
In the context of hanging, then, the test has been inconsistently
applied, causing very different results. For Campbell and Rupe, these
different results meant that one was executed by a method likely to
cause slow and agonizing strangulation or decapitation, and the other
was executed by one of the most "humane and painless" methods known
213. Rupe v. Wood, 863 F. Supp. 1307 (W.D. Wash. 1994). The protocol only goes up to two-
hundred twenty pounds and specifies a five foot drop for the maximum weight on the chart. See
id. at 1309. The state's engineering expert decided five feet was too long of a drop for someone
with Rupe's weight, and recommended a drop of three feet six inches; no medical experts were
consulted in this decision. See id.
214. Id. at 1314. 'The historical literature supports a conclusion that decapitation is more
likely to occur during a long-drop hanging when the condemned person has excessive body
weight." Id. at 1313.
215. See id. at 1314.
216. Id. For this evidence the court considered plaintiff's witnesses who testified that there
was an 80-90% chance of decapitation if the proposed length was used. See id. at 1312.
217. Id. at 1314.
218. See id. at 1315. Rupe was executed by lethal injection, the default method under
Washington's death penalty statute. See supra note 3.
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today. The choice boiled down to a difference of 180 pounds.21 9
In the case of electrocution, results in the lower courts have been
less inconsistent, although under the correct standard, they are all ques-
tionable. In most cases, claims have been denied with little analysis;
courts simply cite Kemmler.22° In cases appealed to the Supreme Court,
several Justices have joined in dissents from denial of certiorari 221 and
have pointed out that in light of modem knowledge regarding electrocu-
tion, Kemmler's factual suppositions are not reliable and should be
reviewed.2
22
There have been many more cases challenging lethal gas and lethal
injection.223 The grounds of challenges to lethal injection have been
numerous, yet the cases have been few where courts took challenges
seriously.224 One newer area of challenges indicates this may not
219. See supra note 3. Other cases dealing with challenges to hanging have often relied on
precedents such as these and not reached the merits of the case. See, e.g., Delaware v. Deputy,
644 A.2d 411 (Del. 1994).
220. See e.g., Glass v. State, 455 So. 2d 659, 659-60 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1080
(1985).
221. See e.g., Poyner v. Murray, 113 S. Ct. 2397 (1993); Glass, 471 U.S. 1080.
222. In Glass, Justice Brennan stated that Kemmler was grounded on a number of "factual
assumptions that appear not to have withstood the test of experience." He believed electrocution
violates human dignity, is incompatible with evolving standards, and is extremely painful. See
471 U.S. at 1081, 1086-89 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
223. The first case to consider the substance of the question in the lethal gas context was Gray,
which has been relied on by other courts to hold lethal gas constitutional. See, e.g., Hunt v. Nuth,
57 F.3d 1327, 1338 (4th Cir. 1995); Arizona v. Greenway, 823 P.2d 22, 27 (Ariz. 1991). In Hunt
v. Smith, the district court of Maryland cited Campbell to hold lethal gas constitutional: If
hanging was not unconstitutional in 1994, then how could lethal gas be unconstitutional? 85 F.
Supp. 251, 260 (D. Md. 1994); aff'd sub nom, Hunt v. Nuth, 57 F.2d 1327 (4th Cir. 1995). Now
that the circuits are split, lower courts need not rely so heavily on these two cases.
224. Several courts post-Fierro II have rejected challenges to lethal injection under Fierro's
framework. See, e.g., Lambright v. Lewis, 932 F. Supp. 1547, 1583-84 (D. Ariz. 1996) (stating
that although execution by lethal gas, in light of Fierro II, is probably unconstitutional, lethal
injection is not). The Lambright court did not simply dismiss the challenge to lethal injection. The
district court first looked at the widespread acceptance of lethal injection, noting that twenty-six
states and the federal government use it, and every court to consider a challenge to lethal injection
upheld its constitutionality. See id. at 1584.
The court also considered the evidence of pain. The petitioner gave one reporter's account of
a lethal injection, which the court decided portrayed a quick death without significant "observed
indications of pain or distress." Id. Technically, under Fierro 11, the Arizona district court should
have looked first at the pain inquiry, and then considered legislative indicators only if the pain
inquiry proved inconclusive. See supra notes 185-93 regarding Fierro 11. However, the
Lambright court looked at both prongs without stating that it found the pain inquiry in lethal
injection to be inconclusive.
In Poland v. Stewart, 92 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 1996), the Ninth Circuit rejected a challenge to
Arizona's death penalty statute, which provided for a choice between lethal gas and lethal
injection. The petitioner raised several arguments. First, he argued that the Arizona death penalty
statute was unconstitutional because it allowed an inmate to choose to be executed by lethal gas, a
method which the Ninth Circuit had declared unconstitutional in Fierro I. See id. at 891-92.
The court stated that if the inmate chose to be executed by lethal gas, this would be only because
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always be so.225 This area involves the medicalization of the death pen-
alty. The Food and Drug Administration, the American Medical Associ-
ation (AMA), and the ethics of the medical profession have all become
involved.
D. Medicalization of the Death Penalty
Several cases have challenged lethal injection as contrary to evolv-
ing standards on the grounds that the AMA does not allow doctors to in
any way participate in an injection.226 This, it is argued, is an objective
indicium of current standards.227 Participation has been described under
the AMA guidelines as selecting the injection sites, prescribing, prepar-
ing or otherwise supervising the drugs, doses, or types, and consulting
with or supervising personnel.228 Doctors are allowed to certify death
and witness executions as long as no active role is taken.229 This forced
he had waived the protections of the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 892. "Since execution of
Poland by lethal gas could only follow his specific choice of that method of execution in the face
of his knowledge of its unconstitutionality, he presents no justiciable claim for relief." Id. The
inmate next argued that lethal injection was cruel and unusual. In rejecting this claim, the Ninth
Circuit dismissed Poland's evidence of botched lethal injections which had occurred in other
states partly on grounds that those other states had dissimilar protocols to Arizona's and could
prove little about possible constitutional violations of the Arizona protocol. See id.
225. In 1983, the First Circuit upheld a challenge to lethal injection on the grounds that the use
of the drugs for lethal injection had not been approved by the FDA, and the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act required the FDA to investigate and take action against unapproved uses. Chaney v.
Heckler, 718 F.2d 174, 1176-77 (1st Cir. 1983); rev'd, Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
The petitioners challenged drugs used in executions as an "unapproved use of an approved drug."
Chaney, 470 U.S. at 823-24. The court of appeals held that the FDA had to approve the drugs as
suitable for human execution under 21 U.S.C. § 355. See id. By failing to exercise its statutory
responsibilities, the court of appeals held, the plaintiffs were faced with the risk of a cruel
execution and a constitutionally impermissible burden on their Eighth Amendment rights. See
Chaney, 718 F.2d at 1192. The Supreme Court overruled the appellate decision, stating that the
FDA's decision not to investigate the use of the drugs or take regulatory action was part of its
enforcement discretion, and this decision was not judicially reviewable under the Administrative
Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). See Chaney, 470 U.S. at 837-38.
226. See Stacy A. Ragon, Comment, A Doctor's Dilemma: Resolving the Conflict Between
Physician Participation in Executions and the AMA's Code of Medical Ethics, 20 U. DAYTON L.
REv. 975, 986-87 (1995). She notes that participation is grounds for sanctions and license
revocation by the AMA. See id. at 991.
227. See Louisiana v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 769 (La. 1992). The argument worked in this
case, but not to challenge the validity of lethal injection itself. Rather, the case concerned the
forcible medication of an insane prisoner to make him fit for execution. See id. at 761. The court
held that AMA standards can be used as objective evidence of contemporary norms. Since
doctors cannot participate in executions, and forcible medication in preparation for an execution is
similar to actual participation in the execution, to allow forcible medication inherently conflicts
with medical ethics under the AMA standards and is contrary to contemporary norms. See id. at
769.
228. See Ragon, supra note 220, at 986-87.
229. See id. at 987-88. The AMA created these guidelines in response to the conflict between
the image of doctor as healer, and that of doctor as executioner. See id. at 988. The "medical
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removal of trained medical personnel from the execution process has
created a conflict with many state statutes that require or allow physician
participation.23 ° Many doctors disapprove of lethal injection as an exe-
cution method even if they do not disapprove of the death penalty itself.
Some doctors have gone so far as to argue that the state should return to
traditional methods of execution, because methods such as electrocution
cannot be mistaken for medical therapy.231
Part of the reason for lethal injection's general societal acceptance
is the perceived humaneness of it and its, however unwanted, association
with the medical profession, which adds sterility and a look of painless-
ness. But if botches caused by untrained personnel become common,
making the risk of pain substantial, or if society one day sees the inher-
ent conflict between the medical model and lethal injection, then the
image of lethal injection may change. With new knowledge, lethal
injection may come to be seen as inhumane, and this may find expres-
sion in legislation. Therefore, even though lethal injection is currently
widely accepted, the Eighth Amendment standard for determining its
constitutionality will continue to be important.
VI. CONCLUSION
In spite of numerous lower court decisions which seem to indicate
otherwise, this paper has argued that a standard for methodology review
under the Eighth Amendment does exist. This standard has been formu-
lated by the Supreme Court throughout the past century and has been
used in various types of Eighth Amendment challenges since the mid
1950s. This standard should apply to methodology review as well as
other challenges. Fierro II and Campbell indicate a misunderstanding of
the standard, resulting in the same court holding that hanging, a method
model" is supposed to be healing and nurturing, yet lethal injection uses the same drugs as are
used to anesthetize. See Colburn, supra note 135, at 13.
230. See Ragon, supra note 226, at 991. These requirements may have been a reaction to
earlier lethal injections performed by untrained non-medical personnel where, in some cases, the
injection was horribly bungled. Currently, thirty-four of thirty-six state statutes reference the
presence of a physician at executions and seventeen require the physician to pronounce death. See
id. at 980-81. Some states have dealt with the ethical conflict by allowing wardens to obtain the
drugs without a prescription and by allowing trained non-medical personnel to perform the
execution. See Colburn, supra note 135, at 14. Colburn also noted that often a lethal injection
machine performs the procedure, and the physician only certifies death. See id. at 14-15.
231. See ZIMRINO AND HAWKINS, supra note 141, at 114-15; see also Colburn, supra note 135,
at 15. Colburn cites a doctor who thinks lethal injection is no more humane than electrocution, as
in electrocution, loss of consciousness is fairly quick. Maybe new evidence will arise indicating
that lethal injection is actually very painful and that the person is conscious for a long time. This
is possible, as the first drug in a injection is a muscle paralyzer; thus, there are no outward signs of
pain, creating the illusion that lethal injection is painless. See id. at 13.
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"associated with lynchings . . . [and] ... frontier justice,' '2 32 is constitu-
tional, but lethal gas, which many states adopted as a more humane
alternative to hanging, is unconstitutional. Had these cases been ana-
lyzed under the appropriate standard, the results would not have been so
incongruous.
Numerous other lower court decisions also indicate the courts' gen-
eral uncertainty about review of Eighth Amendment challenges. Finally,
the newer challenges to lethal injection illustrate that the furor is by no
means over by the simple adoption of lethal injection in most states.
KRISTINA E. BEARD
232. Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 701 (9th Cir. 1994) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
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